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ABSTRACT
e nancial services industry has unique explainability and fair-
ness challenges arising from compliance and ethical considerations
in credit decisioning. ese challenges complicate the use of model
machine learning and articial intelligence methods in business
decision processes.
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Financial services companies in the USA make highly regulated
business decisions that complicate the use of recommender systems
and other forms of articial intelligence. Key business processes
such as determining who qualies for lines of credit (personal loans,
credit cards, mortgages, etc.) must be shown to comply with fair
lending laws such as the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA)
[54], Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) [53], Fair and Accurate
Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) [55], Fair Housing Act (FHA) [51],
Fair and Equal Housing Act (FEHA) [56], and Consumer Credit
Protection Act (CCPA) [52]. Some of these laws dene protected
classes (see Table 1), for which discrimination on the basis of a
customer’s membership in those classes is prohibited.
Under these fair lending laws, lenders must demonstrate that
their business decisions do not discriminate. However, there are
multiple notions of discrimination in fair lending. e two major
theories of discrimination are:
disparate treatment [61], informally, intentionally treating
people dierently on the basis on a protected class, and
disparate impact [47], informally, discriminating against
any protected class as a resulting from implementing of a
facially neutral policy.
Dierent theories of discrimination may apply for dierent laws.
Disparate impact as a theory of discrimination under FHA has
been conrmed by the Supreme Court; however, there is some
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Table 1: Protected classes denedunderUS fair lending laws
such as the Fair Housing Act (FHA) [51] and Equal Credit
Opportunity Act (ECOA) [54].
Law FHA[51] ECOA[54]
age X
color X X
disability X
exercised rights under CCPA[52] X
familial status (household composition) X
gender identity X
marital status (single or married) X
national origin X X
race X X
recipient of public assistance X
religion X X
sex X X
uncertainty as to whether disparate impact is a proper theory of
discrimination under ECOA [3, 20, 37, 45].1
is position paper summarizes some of the main compliance,
explainability and fairness considerations arising out of regulated
business decisioning in the nancial services industry that pose
unique challenges for using recommender systems.
Disparate impact considerations constrain the use of features that
correlate strongly with protected classes. e need to demonstrate
lack of disparate impact means that a model for credit risk has
to avoid features like zip code, which is highly correlated with
race [32], a protected class. Using zip code in a model therefore
runs the risk of redlining, the denial of services in neighborhoods
populated mainly by racial minorities [13, 18, 40]. Other variables
that may be predictive of credit risk, such as length of credit history,
correlate with age of customer, another prohibited class [3], and
may require remediation in automated scoring systems [18]. Even
seemingly innocuous policies like a minimum principal amount
for a loan [44] may introduce bias against one or more protected
classes [1, 41, 48]. Disparate impact considerations also complicate
the use of nontraditional data sources such as social network data,
which reect and exacerbate deeply rooted societal inequalities
[6, 29, 59].
1While several courts and regulators believe that disparate impact should be considered
under ECOA [18, 40], the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB) has signaled
that it may issue guidance in the near future that will limit the use of disparate impact
claims under ECOA [19].
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Similar considerations apply for models that are used in direct
marketing to pre-screened potential customers [10, 49], where
credit bureau data are used to generate lists of consumers that
qualify for a credit card oer. According to FCRA, each marketing
oer to a prescreened customer is a rm oer of credit; all a cus-
tomer needs to do is accept the oer to obtain credit [53]. erefore,
marketing campaigns for credit have compliance considerations
similar to credit decisioning models, on top of any issues around
the consumers’ perceptions of fairness [35, 36, 39]. Any articial
intelligence or machine learning models used for these purposes,
including recommender systems, must therefore be capable of as-
sessment for fair lending considerations.
Assessing discrimination poses unique challenges when customers’
memberships in protected classes are unknown. Credit card com-
panies do not generally collect information about an applicant’s
race, but may have a compliance need to demonstrate the lack of
disparate impact with regard to race. Regulators like the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) have published assessment
methodologies that describe the use of proxy models to impute race
labels [17, 23]. However, the resulting assessment seems to overes-
timate the amount of disparate impact [4, 60] and has resulted in
some controversy [4, 14–16, 19, 33]. To the best of our knowledge,
assessing disparate impact in the absence of known labels is an area
that has yet to be discussed in the fair, accountable and transparent
machine learning community.
Fair lending laws require credit decisions to be explainable. An
adverse action notice is required by ECOA and FCRA if a customer
is denied credit based on information in a credit report [53, 54].
According to the ocial interpretation of the law, such a notice must
provide specic reasons for denying credit [22, ¶9(b)(2)]. erefore,
AI/ML systems used to extend credit must also be able to provide
the explanations necessary for adverse action.
Having explainable processes is important not only for determin-
ing regulatory compliance, but also to “debug” and redress errors in
business practice, such as data quality errors in credit bureaux and
other data sources [57]. Having “debuggable” credit lending prac-
tices is even more desirable when considering that 5% of Americans
have errors in their credit reports that adversely aect their credit-
worthiness [24]. Accounting for such data quality errors has added
moral and ethical dimensions [7, 12], particularly when noting that
the presence of such issues is itself correlated with protected classes,
such as race, due to complex socioeconomic factors [2, 27, 28, 46].
For example, Latinos/Hispanics are more likely than whites and
African-Americans to have no credit history [30]. Remediating
such errors and omissions can break vicious cycles for people with
bad credit due to erroneous credit reports, and for people who have
no credit and hence no credit history [41]. Debuggability can also
help businesses quickly identify problematic features that have the
potential to generate customer dissatisfaction [34].
Can complex models be explained and proven to be fair on a case-
by-case basis? e desire for explainability appears to clash with
the desire to use complex models that may provide improved li
or classication accuracy [25, 50]. is kind of complexity has
sometimes been termed “opacity at scale” [9]. Multi-armed bandits
[8, 58] and other forms of reinforcement learning [31, 38] pose fur-
ther explainability challenges, due to the statefulness resulting from
multiple rounds of learning. However, recent work on automatic
model explanations [43, 50] suggest that it is possible to generate
relatively short explanations for the predictions produced for any
particular set of inputs and outputs. Inspired by these investiga-
tions, we propose to study how to generate explanations that are
rated favorably by human subjects. Possible avenues of study are
stated below:
Hypothesis: dierent audiences require dierent explanations. Ex-
plainability cannot exist as a quality purely independent of a target
audience. A complete description of a business process that em-
ploys machine learning models requires mastery of the language
of the business context in addition to understanding the jargon
and nuance surrounding statistical modeling. Only an expert data
scientist who is intimately familiar with the business has a reason-
able chance of understanding the full operational denition of an
abstract concept like creditworthiness. Consequently, explanations
that are satisfactory to other audiences such as business executives,
data scientists in other industries or academia, lawmakers and reg-
ulators, and customers, require dierent levels of distillation to
convey appropriate levels of explanation that use vocabularies and
phrasing comprehensible to the target audiences. We hypothesize
that satisfaction with explanations will be at best moderately corre-
lated when the same explanation is presented to domain experts
and to the lay public.
Hypothesis: directly measurable features are more explainable. We
argue that features that are directly measurable, such as a cuto
based on a customer’s annual salary, are more intuitive and hence
convey more explanatory power than a feature that mixes many
such features. Examples of the laer include being in the highest
risk twentile predicted by another model, or the largest principal
component built from all credit bureau information, or even a land-
mark feature produced by running a fast (if less accurate) machine
learning algorithm [42]. We posit that landmark features and princi-
pal components, while popular as meta-features for meta-learning
[5, 26], are less intuitive and hence more dicult to use in satisfac-
tory explanations. us locality in the space of directly measured
features is an important factor that explains explainability.
Hypothesis: explanations from complex models are less satisfactory
than explanations from local approximants. Building upon the idea
that locality in feature space promotes explainability, we also spec-
ulate that explanations built from the output of local approximants,
such as Local Interpretable Model-Agnostic Explanations (LIME)
[43] or antitative Input Inuence (QII) [21], will be rated as more
explainable than explanations built directly upon the result of a
complex model such as a neural network.
Hypothesis: human ratings of satisfaction with explanations may
dier from metrics based on statistical quality. We argue that the
relationship between customer satisfaction with explanations and
metrics proposed in the literature, such as Turner’s model quality
score [50], is well worth investigating. We already know that in
other machine learning disciplines such as topic modeling that
human evaluations can behave in unexpected ways: in topic mod-
eling, human ratings of topic quality are negatively correlated with
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statistical likelihood measures [11]. Furthermore, given our asser-
tion above that explainability cannot be independent of the target
audience, we expect that general customers will demand dierent
level of explanations from domain experts.
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